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The Italian Army in the Second World War: A 
Historiographical Analysis 
Simon Gonsalves 
Wilfred Laurier University 
Abstract 
Classical English language analysis of Italy's role in the Second 
World War has done poorly in its attempt to accurately the Italian 
military's contribution to the Axis cause. Basing their analysis on 
flawed sources, historians in the intermediate post war era got much 
incorrect. Many of the staples of the World War Two genre still base 
much of their writing on these writers. This paper concludes by 
exploring the two most important modern writers who specialize in 
this area of military history. 
Keywords: Italy, World War Two, Historiography, Twentieth century 
history 
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Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, legendary wartime
leader, and admired historian was well known by his fellow politicians 
in the House of Commons for his clever wit and snappy retorts. 
During a prewar diplomatic conference, with the looming storm 
clouds of war on the horizon, Churchill sat across from Germany’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs - Joachim von Ribbentrop. Brimming with 
confidence, Ribbentrop proclaimed that in the event of war with 
Britain, the Italians would be a steadfast German ally. Churchill 
responded with one of his characteristic verbal ripostes; “That’s only 
fair – we had them last time.”1 
Churchill was of course referring to Italy’s notoriously poor military 
performance in the First World War.  Almost a century has passed 
since Churchill made his famous remark, and to this day opinion has 
hardly shifted on the subject. A comical example of the enduring 
popularity of this perception is the first result of an online image search 
of the Italian Navy – a pizza floating lamely in the ocean. Throughout 
the vast academic literature concerning the Second World War, Italy’s 
support for the Axis cause has long been either ignored, 
misinterpreted, or simply dismissed as irrelevant. The Simon and 
Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II goes as far as to title the 
notable 1940 conflict between Greece and Italy under "Balkans, 
German Invasion of."2 
Italy’s role in the Second World War has often been reduced to mere 
footnotes, though Italy’s armed forces participated in some of the most 
heavily contested theatres of the war, such as the North and East 
Africa, the U.S.S.R., Greece, the Balkans, and France. Italy’s early 
surrender and factional re-alignment during the war stands in stark 
contrast to Nazi Germany’s unforgiving struggle to the last magazine 
- climaxing at the grim last stand at Berlin, and Imperial Japan’s
1  Crawford, Five Minutes in Berlin. (Edinburgh: Murry McLellen, 2015.) 
Digital Edition: https://books.google.ca/ books?id=L8waCwAAQBAJ&pg. 
2 James Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-
1941. The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 4 (1994), 620.  
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fanatical resistance across the Pacific. Historians of the Second World 
War have, more often than not, allowed the plentiful, deeply negative 
tropes regarding Italy’s actions during the World War Two to 
continually permeate their works.   
The objective of this essay is to examine the origin as well as the 
substance of these common historical narratives concerning the guerra 
fascista (the period between 1939 and 1943) which have circulated in 
academia and popular culture since the country’s ignoble exit from the 
Second World War. Furthermore, it aims to document the fascinating 
historiographic debate in English language literature regarding the 
source of Fascist Italy’s military failures from 1940 to 1943. Since the 
army was the most important service, as it possessed the most financial 
and political power, it will be the centre of analysis.  
Historical Context 
During the scramble for Africa, Italy was the only European state to 
have its colonial ambitions in Africa dashed on the field of battle by a 
non-European state. Driven out of Ethiopia in 1895, the country’s 
participation in the First World War was equally catastrophic.3 
Stalemated by the Austro-Hungarian army for years, the furthest 
Italian advance was only ten miles into Austrian territory.4 The Italian 
Army was routed by the German offensive at Caporetto in 1917, where 
the considerably outnumbered Central Powers took approximately 
300,000 prisoners.5 In the interwar period, Italy’s Imperial ambitions 
led to the invasion of a series of nations far weaker and significantly 
less developed than themselves. While these proved ultimately 
successful for Italy, they did little to repair the reputation of Italy’s 
armed forces.  
3 Vandervort, Bruce. Wars of imperial conquest in Africa, 1830-1914. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 43. 
4 John, Gooch. The Italian Army and the First World War (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3. 
5 Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War, 4. 
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It was Italy’s participation in the Second World War that shaped 
contemporary perceptions of the Italian military the most.  The results 
of Italian foreign policy between the years of 1940 and 1943 are almost 
uniformly perceived as dismal. Declaring war on the Allied powers in 
the summer of 1940, the Italian Fascist Benito Mussolini unleashed his 
country’s military with the ambition to become a Roman Empire of 
the 20th century. The Italian strongman aimed to conquer the 
Mediterranean and “make Italy a world power with an empire from 
Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf.”6 The successful prosecution of the war 
was vital to the regime’s continued existence. 
After the German Reich’s invasion of Poland, Mussolini was pressured 
to stay out of the war. However, in the summer of 1940, the situation 
changed. With French collapse, British vulnerability, and Germany 
triumphant, a window of opportunity for Mussolini appeared to have 
opened. However, military stockpiles were still largely depleted 
because of Italy’s involvement in in the Spanish Civil War.7 Italy 
decided to enter a war that, by its own admission, it was not prepared 
to fight until at least 1943.8 Within six months, Mussolini’s grand vision 
had burned to ashes around him. His most significant conquest turned 
out to be a “dusty and useless corner of Africa – British Somaliland.”9 
By the beginning of 1941, the Italian military “faced defeat in the 
Balkans at the hands of Greece, the loss of the entirety of Italian 
territory in Africa to the British, as well as total defeat at sea.”10 The 
German dictator Adolf Hitler snidely commented that the unfolding 
catastrophe “has had the healthy effect of once more compressing 
6 Macgregor Knox, Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 144. 
7 Brian Sullivan, “Fascist Italy's Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil 
War,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1995), 711. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944499. 
8 Pietro Badoglio. Italy in the Second World War. (London: Oxford University 
Pres, 1948), 1. 
9 Macgregor Knox. Hitler’s Italian Allies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), i. 
10 Knox. Hitler’s Italian Allies. 80. 
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Italian claims to within the natural boundaries of Italian 
competency.”11  
During the next two years, Italy hardly fared any better, driving the 
Italians from Africa, Anglo-American forces landed on the beaches of 
Sicily in 1943. Once news of the Allied landings reached Rome, the 
“regime crumbled without any real resistance.”12 Many German 
officers still smoldered from Italy’s ‘defection’ from the Central 
Powers to the Allied Entente in 1915.13   When the new Italian 
government changed allegiances to the Allied cause, vengeful German 
divisions rushed to occupy the country. This important change of 
loyalty had apparently not reached all the troops on the ground. When 
German units arrived to disarm the country’s military, it came as a 
shock for much of the army and organized resistance collapsed and 
never re-organized.14 In fact, Wehrmacht forces managed to hold 
much of the northern areas of the country until the very last days of 
the war.  
The Myths of the Immediate Post War Period 
There is no doubt amongst historians, strategists, and political 
scientists that Fascist Italy lost the Second World War, despite 
abandoning, and subsequently declaring war on Germany in 1943. 
However, while there is clear consensus over the outcomes of the 
various battles and campaigns, the explanations for why the war went 
the way it did for Italy have been argued relentlessly through the years. 
Historical narratives constructed shortly after the war became 
incredibly influential. One of the most prevalent historiographical 
tropes was that the policies implemented by the Fascist government 
were principally responsible for Italy’s military downfall. In the years 
following the war, central figures in the Italian military establishment 
sought to shape the narrative surrounding the calamitous war years. In 
11 Know. Hitler’s Italian Allies. 18.  
12 Know, Hitler’s Italian Allies. 20. 
13 Correlli Barnett, World War Two Encyclopedia. (Westport: H.S. Stuttman 
Publishers, 1978), 262.  
14 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 21. 
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an attempt to defend their legacies, honour, and self-interest, they 
sought to place the lion’s share of the blame on a man few would 
publicly defend: Mussolini. Therefore, Mussolini and his fascist 
principles provided a practical scapegoat for Italians looking towards 
future employment within Allied dominated Italy. This is why “it is 
relatively easy to find Italian memoirs that are sharply critical of 
opposing figures.”15 Disassociating themselves from the regime’s most 
divisive actions, the country’s surviving political figures deflected 
charges of Italian incompetence and criminality during the war’s 
prosecution towards a figure and ideology already demonized by the 
Allied powers. Personal responsibility for failure among the surviving 
military elite was thus mitigated, and the potentialities of criminal trials 
were also avoided.  
The first histories of the war were the personal accounts of the men 
who fought in the war. While unquestionably an important part of 
historical study, war memoirs are typically imbued with a normative 
agenda and should be viewed with caution and a critical eye. Taking an 
individual’s recounting of events as definitive has significant 
historiographical dangers. This tendency becomes noticeable in Pietro 
Badoglio’s Italy in the Second World War. Translated into English in the 
early 1950’s, Badoglio describes his time as Italy’s Chief of Staff during 
the first year of the war. It also includes his subsequent experiences, 
following his dismissal after the military calamities of 1940, as the 
figurehead of the nominal Italian government in exile. Badoglio’s 1948 
book was a character assassination of the Fascist leader. Mussolini was 
described as a military amateur who constantly meddled in the affairs 
of professional military men. In an effort to project his own personal 
failings onto Mussolini, Badoglio branded his former ruler as a 
narcissistic, incompetent, warmongering tyrant. Mussolini was labelled 
as a man possessing “an overwhelming belief in his own genius… who 
believed himself to be immeasurably superior to the rest of 
mankind.”16 According to the former general, Mussolini bore sole 
responsibility for Italy’s entry into the war. The Duce, and his enabling 
15 Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, 635. 
16 Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, 3. 
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sycophants, were responsible for Italy’s lack of preparation and the 
abysmal prosecution of the conflict. As the British government saw 
Badoglio as a strident anti-communist and detached enough from the 
Fascist regime, he was never tried for the war crimes committed in 
Africa under his watch.17  
While Badoglio was not the only Italian to popularize this style of 
narrative, his biased work was one of the few Italian accounts 
translated into English. This was a consequence of the Cold War, a 
conflict that significantly impacted the way Western academics 
perceived Italy’s war effort.  As the fault line between east and west 
ran through a divided Germany, Central Europe would certainly 
become a battleground if the Soviet Union and the Western powers 
ever went to war. As a ground war between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact appeared ever more likely, Anglo-American military planners 
turned to the only people with real combat experience fighting the 
Russians; the veterans of the German military. The Wehrmacht spent 
much of the war locked in a virtual death grip with the Soviet Red 
Army. Coming close to victory over the Soviet Union on multiple 
occasions in 1941 and 1942, many architects of future wars were just 
as anxious for former German soldiers to pass on the lessons learned 
through four and a half years of war of apocalyptic combat.18 
Due to America’s desperate need of actionable intelligence on the 
Soviet Bloc, war accounts from the German perspective were quickly 
translated into English. The Italian outlook, demolished as a significant 
power on the continent and discredited by their military fiasco, was of 
little interest to the Americans or the British Commonwealth. German 
military commanders were given a platform to forge their own 
narrative of the war. Due to Cold War tensions, Russian sources were 
inaccessible. Lacking the other perspective, Anglo- American 
historiography during the post-war era placed far too much trust in the 
17 Effie Pedaliu. “Britain and the ‘Hand-over’ of Italian War Criminals to 
Yugoslavia, 1945–48”. Journal of Contemporary History. Vol 9 No 4 (2004), 
506. 
18 Sadkovich, “Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War 
II,” 44. 
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authority of German primary sources, often echoing their accounts 
practically verbatim.19 
Numerous German generals used this opportunity to shift much of the 
responsibility for the German military’s eventual downfall onto the 
Italian armed forces, a military already popularly discredited. The 
dominant post-war revisionist narrative to romanticise the German 
war effort was largely powered by famous Wehrmacht generals such 
as Erich von Manstein, Friedrich von Mellinthin, and Heinz Guderian. 
Just as these figures were influential in creating the impressions that 
prejudiced the American view of the Eastern Front, the German 
perspective was equally important in the way Italy was viewed in 
historical accounts published after the war. German writers were 
instrumental in popularizing the second major Italian historical 
narrative; that the moral inadequacies and “simple cowardice” of the 
Italian soldier lost Italy the war. While not always the case, the 
argument that Italian “hearts were just not in the war” frequently came 
sheathed in the language of race.20 
It should come as little surprise that German writers, conditioned to 
the overtly racist attitudes of the early twentieth century, would make 
great use of racial theory to explain Italian defeats during the war. Even 
by the standards of the era, the National Socialist regime was 
infamously fond of associating cause and effect with ethnic ancestry. 
There is no question that the “Germans looked down on their ally as 
racially inferior, and that this view was shared by the major German 
figures.21 Siegfried Westphal, Chief of Staff of the German/Italian 
Panzer Army in North Africa, considered that the lack of aggressive 
spirit among Italians, officers and soldiers alike, was derived from their 
'southern tendencies,’ which “made them too emotional and unsteady 
                                                          
19 Sadkovich, “Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War 
II,” 42.  
20 Ian Stanley Ord Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 1, The 
Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (1954), 336 ; James Sadkovich, “Of 
Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, 1940-1942”. The 
International History Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1991), 312. 
21 Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa”, 
311. 
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to be good soldiers.”22 Kesselring, the overall German commander in 
the Mediterranean theatre, stated that the average Italian was not 
qualified to even carry a weapon, and was “conceited, saddled with a 
vivid imagination which made it difficult for him to tell reality from 
fantasy, and easily contented with coffee, cigarettes, and women.”23 
German military commanders propagated these myths and stereotypes 
in an attempt to salvage their own reputations. According to German 
sources, the Italians defending the Don River positions supporting the 
German advance into Stalingrad disintegrated because of deficiencies 
in Italian courage. Wehrmacht officers later argued that the 
unwillingness of the Italian 8th army to hold its ground allowed the 
German 6th army to be encircled within the city and annihilated. Italian 
mistakes in North Africa, supposedly caused by faint-hearted and 
hesitant command decisions, dragged down critical German units that 
could have been used decisively elsewhere.24 In short, German 
historiography argued that Italian incompetence was rooted in an 
inherent biological inferiority and snatched German defeat from the 
jaws of victory. German writers during this period argued Italy’s defeat 
was continually postponed by the efforts of the audacious Wehrmacht 
soldier through his Germanic fighting spirit and leadership. Italy was 
saved again and again by the “genial Hitler and his superior German 
war machine, which met its own ruin as a result of its generous aid to 
its pitiable and ridiculous ally.”25 
The Western Allies were receptive to this point of view. Allied press 
reports regarding the Italians were trivializing, while portraying the 
Germans in a much more frighteningly proficient fashion. British 
wartime propaganda consistently highlighted the rout of the Italian 10th 
Army in Libya by a numerically inferior British force. From the British 
perspective, Italian failure in North Africa demonstrated the lack of 
22 Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men”, 311. 
23 Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men”, 312.  
24 Sadkovich, “Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,” 
626. 
25 Sadkovich, “Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,” 
626.
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ability among Italy’s leadership, as well as the absence of popular 
support for the war among Italian soldiers. After the United States 
entered the conflict, this attitude was passed on to the Americans by 
Britain.26 
This racist understanding of history was parroted by postwar historians 
in the first wave of non-biographical works. Writing on the North 
African theatre regarding Italian retreat and German intervention, 
Kenneth Macksey in 1972 argued that “the British threw out the Italian 
Chicken only to let in the German Eagle.”27 British General Sir William 
Jackson, writing a few years later, claimed that the defeat of the Italians 
on the dunes of the Western Desert in early 1941 opened the way for 
“two races of equal fighting quality - the British and German.”28 
Considering intense and widespread German anti-Italian prejudice, the 
blind acceptance of German sources as an objective source of 
information is the most serious flaw of early Anglo American 
historiography.   
Macgregor Knox - Foundation of Modern Historiography 
The historian Macgregor Knox is the author “whose works have most 
shaped the views of readers of English on the Italian military.”29 Knox 
is considered an expert on both foreign and military policies of both 
the Fascist and National Socialist regimes. Having published numerous 
articles and books on Second World War Italian military history, Knox 
was the first English writer to present a holistic analysis of the Italian 
war effort. The writings of Knox have had substantial repercussions 
for Italian historiography. Comprehensive modern histories of the 
Second World War base their depiction of Italian involvement 
primarily on Knox’s research. As this kind of history is the most widely 
26 Ian Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in 
North Africa. (Ramsbury, England: The Crowood Press, 2003),  61-62. 
27 Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts, 286. 
28 Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts, 286. 
29 James Sadkovich, “Fascist Italy at War”. The International Historical Review, 
Vol. 14, No. 3 (1992), 526.  
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read, Knox’s influence on both the public at large and military 
academia has been colossal. 
The works of Macgregor Knox do not simply repeat the myths of a 
dictator unilaterally pushing his nation to destruction or a people’s 
refusal (or ability) to fight. At the beginning of his book, Hitler’s Italian 
Allies, Knox writes that the “Italian dictator’s sovereign fecklessness 
and the alleged absence of popular support for the war” are only partial 
answers at best. Knox’s acknowledgment of these long-standing tropes 
surrounding Italy’s bitter military defeat was an important 
historiographical change. Knox was by no means fond of Mussolini: 
Mussolini was a “military dilettante.”30 Although clearly controlling the 
nation’s foreign policy, Mussolini was “conscious of his own lack of 
experience and understandably reluctant to damage his aura of 
dictatorial infallibility.”31 Furthermore, Knox argues that the 
“restraints under which Mussolini labored” severely constrained his 
ability to act unilaterally.32 Mussolini lacked Hitler’s totalitarian control, 
and had to compromise with a deeply entrenched establishment: 
parliament, monarchy, army, the church, and fascist conservatives. 
Limited in his power, he only interfered in matters of military 
professionals when the situation demanded it. The Duce was reluctant 
to spend his limited political capital infuriating his military. As such, he 
tended to let his military establishment handle their own house, by 
allowing them to control their own organization, procurement 
strategies, and tactical doctrine.33 As detailed later, this would have 
serious consequences. 
Knox writes that the Italian soldier had two undeniably excellent 
qualities; “the willingness to suffer… and (if led with anything 
approaching competency) the willingness to fight and die.”34 He 
30 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 7. 
31 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 43. 
32 Knox, Common Destiny, 111 
33 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 47. 
34 “The Italian Armed Forces: 1940 – 3” in Allan Millet and Murray Williamson 
(eds.), Military Effectiveness, Volume Three: The Second World War. (Unwyn 
Hyman: London, 1988),143. 
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contends that the popular myth, that the Italian soldier considered 
World War  II “a war not felt” is simply not true.35 Despite the claims 
of wartime propaganda, 'cowardice' in the Italian army was no greater 
than any other major armed force of the time. Knox notes that Italian 
units were “enduring and fatalistically stubborn” and stood and fought 
in the vast majority of scenarios. When Italian troops surrendered en 
masse it was due to encirclement and faced with certain annihilation, 
not cowardice in pitched battle.36  
Mussolini’s “strategic megalomania,”37 ideological convictions, and 
character flaws effectively tied Italian fortunes to a Third Reich bent 
on self-immolation. Knox effectively asserts that Germany’s 
instigation of global war by the end of 1941, barring improbable levels 
of allied incompetence, “would have destroyed the Fascist regime of 
Italy regardless of their level of military or economic effectiveness.”38 
After Hitler’s failure to win the broader war in 1941/1942, the conflict 
was essentially over. The scientific, demographic, and financial 
advantages of the Grand Alliance of Britain, the United States and the 
Soviet Union would have certainly crushed the Axis though given 
enough time.  
Though his foreign policy blunders had ensured his country’s ultimate 
defeat, the reason why the Italian army was so remarkably ineffectual 
was not Mussolini’s cross to bear alone. Italy still could have 
maintained a degree of dignity in its defeat. Knox makes the innovative 
argument that Italy’s military humiliation during the Second World 
War was “first and foremost a failure of Italy’s military culture and 
military institutions.”39 The troubles of the Italian war effort had 
longstanding structural roots within the Italian state that can be traced 
back to its unification in the 1870’s. Comparable flaws were apparent 
35  “The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3”, 143 
36  “The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3”, 141. 
37 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 1. 
38 Know, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 2. 
39 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, x. 
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in the Italian “North and South, Left and Right, workers, industrialists, 
and generals.”40 
Eschewing racial justifications, Knox uses a cultural lens to explain the 
disastrous results of Italy’s war. According to Knox’s analysis, the most 
significant of Italian cultural inadequacies was the enduring resistance 
to modernity that reached across Italian society. The pervasive 
narrowmindedness was a widespread cultural trait of mistrust, dividing 
the nation by language, geography, and social class. Furthermore, there 
was an ingrained and “fierce resistance to precision and rationale 
planning.”41 Knox argues that these cultural factors created a society 
short on common trust, collaboration, and natural teamwork. In the 
campaign against British Somaliland, Italian command staff sought to 
use inter-personal rivalries to their advantage. By placing feuding 
officers in adjacent attack sectors, they would “put the wind under 
their feet.”42 To the surprise of the staff officers involved, both 
commanders “concentrated essentially on preventing the other from 
getting there first.”43 Moreover, inter- service rivalries were endemic. 
Each branch of the military controlled weapons development and 
production completely independent of one another, and kept 
cooperation at the bare minimum.44 Tactical integration was no better. 
There was underlying fear across the Italian military of losing power 
through apparent subordination to another branch. Without any kind 
of doctrinal framework or cooperation between ground and air forces, 
the Italian army’s ability execute offensive operations was effectively 
hamstrung. As each arm planned their operations independently, the 
army was deprived of the tactical advantages of close air support.45 This 
development stood in juxtaposition to the Wehrmacht which had 
mastered cooperation between the service branches and achieved 
considerable success.  
40 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 29 
41 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 28. 
42 Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940 – 3, 165. 
43 Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 157. 
44 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 38. 
45 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 113. 
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Some of the problems could never have been fully mitigated. Italy 
lacked a large industrial sector. Still largely agrarian, the country’s 
output was only a fraction of that of its German ally and the smallest 
of the major industrialized states.46 Italy suffered from a lack raw war 
materials, a situation made worse by the British naval blockade. Even 
considering these factors, the regime “failed miserably in mobilizing 
the nation’s resources.”47 An influx of raw materials would not have 
changed the deeply flawed organizational/ideological structure of the 
Italian military nor its industrial base.  
Italy lacked a well-developed national military culture and tradition. 
Combined with a lack of national unity, “the absence of altruism in the 
service of higher national purposes”48 created a highly dysfunctional 
military procurement system. This justifies why industrialists involved 
in the armaments industry happily swindled the national war effort 
through “illegal cartels and all manners of deceptive practices.”49 As 
leading manufacturers consistently threatened to instigate labour 
unrest and production stoppages, the Army accepted the continued 
production of ineffective or useless weapons in fear “of ending up with 
no weapons at all.”50 In addition, due to a “culture of stubborn and 
parochial backwardness,” Italian manufacturers failed to update their 
production and quality control techniques.51 Clinging to old models of 
skilled workers “slowly hand crafting obsolete weapons,” they refused 
to adopt standardized models in mass production lines that allowed 
the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Germany to produce much more 
efficiently than Italian Industry.52 Crippled by self-inflicted injuries, 
Italy could not produce the large quantities of modern war material 
that was desperately needed.  
46 Knox, Common Destiny, 148. 
47 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, Introduction. 
48 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 28. 
49 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 28 
50 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 42. 
51 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 42. 
52 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 45. 
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Italy’s military elite proved “wholly unable to imagine modern 
warfare,” let alone prepare and fight battles that depended on using 
mechanized, combined arms tactics. 53 Instead of accepting that war 
had now become a contest of machines, the Italian army’s conservative 
and rigid leadership placed its faith in mass formations of infantry. 
Numerically enlarged the army to the largest possible size, “Italy’s eight 
million bayonets” would overcome all resistance.54 However, in the 
maelstrom of modern warfare “superiority in numbers tended only to 
produce superior numbers of maimed, missing, killed, and captured.”55 
This attitude also influenced the army’s force organization and 
equipment procurement. Most of the nation’s resources went toward 
basic infantry equipment for the inflated mass of manpower, while 
critical up-to-date war machines were given low priority as “innovation 
remained suspect” throughout the army.56 Italy thus went into North 
Africa lacking sufficient armored units and mobile infantry. The 
mobility and firepower that was critical to success in desert warfare 
was nowhere to found.  
An insightful report was compiled by Italian intelligence on the nature 
of the German blitzkrieg, or ‘lightning war.’ This approach to 
mechanized warfare proved extraordinarily successful in the early years 
of the war. Badoglio, the army chief of staff, responded to this 
information by dismissively stating that “we’ll study it when the war is 
over.”57  The proud ignorance of the Italian general staff prevented the 
embracement of more effective approaches to warfare that 
handicapped the army in the field.  In addition, the dominant military 
culture was one that emphasized mind over matter. Marshall Graziani, 
Italy’s 1940 North African theatre commander, boldly stated that 
“when the cannon sounds, everything will fall into place.”58 There was 
a “widespread assumption that in battle, intuition and individual valor 
53 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, Intro. 
54 Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 162. 
55 Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 162. 
56 Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 47.  
57 Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 154. 
58 Knox, The Italian Armed Forces: 1940-3, 171. 
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counted for more than training.”59 It should come as no surprise that 
there was little emphasis on training the reservists and conscripts that 
formed the vast bulk of the army.  
A smaller, more effectively trained, equipped, and mobile army could 
have taken advantage of the dismal allied situation of 1940/41 by using 
all of Italy’s might in a short, aggressive campaign. Unfortunately, deep 
flaws in Italy’s military culture strangled any attempt to build a force 
composition that harmonized with Italian strengths and strategic 
objectives. Structural issues in the Italian military culture caused the 
Italian military industrial complex to produce the “least effective, least 
numerous, and most overpriced weapons of the Second World War.”60  
The ethos of the military and the country as a whole led to the 
deployment of a military thoroughly technologically backward.  
Knox finds plenty historical exemplars to support this. Italian Infantry 
were ordered to engage forces wielding vastly superior weaponry and 
equipment. The Italian 8th army, marching into the maw of Operation 
Barbarossa, was even issued boots whose soles were made out of 
cardboard.61 Italian tankers were sent into battle in obsolete vehicles 
that were outclassed in almost every way. The most effective Italian 
tank produced in any real quantity, the mechanically unreliable M14, 
could hardly dent British Grants and Crusader IIIs. A single hit by an 
enemy gun could prove fatal, as thin Italian tank armor “would 
sometimes shatter like glass.”62 Tank crews operated without any form 
of radio until mid-1941, and the compensated compasses necessary for 
effective desert navigation were never issued.63  Air support was equally 
poor. The Italian SM85 dive bombers often “proved more dangerous 
to their crews then the enemy.”64  The fighters of the Italian air force 
were often underpowered, outgunned, and without electronic 
navigational aids. Knox states that the most effective machines Italian 
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industry managed to create were manufactured too late and in too few 
numbers to have any noticeable impact.65 This dismal and depressingly 
long list is symbolic on Knox’s holistic view on the Italian war effort. 
In his military analysis, Knox argues that the fact that the Italian Army 
held together as long as it did was remarkable considering the flaws 
inherent within its military establishment.  
The Revisionist Position 
The historian James Sandkovich is one of the more recent historians 
to attempt a reimagining of Italy’s role in the Second World War.  A 
fierce critic of Knox, Sandkovich argues that “Italy's failures have often 
been overstated, while Germany's have been understated.”66 When 
placed in a wider context, Italy upheld its part of the Axis alliance 
whereas the 3rd Reich did not. Sandvovich argues that Italian economy 
was an important contributor to the Axis alliance. Italy produced 
proportionately similar quantities of weaponry compared to Germany. 
Artillery, aircraft, and armored vehicles were manufactured at around 
twenty percent of the overall German total; this is similar to the 
disparity between the overall economic power of the two countries.67 
This is a remarkable achievement, given Italy’s structural economic 
problems. In addition, Sandvovich asserts that at the war’s start Italy’s 
weapon systems performed at the same level as the weaponry of the 
other major powers.68 Italian research and development actually 
managed to design some of the war’s best armaments; the Cannone 
90/53 canon and the Macchi C.205 fighter being the most impressive. 
Even the P.26/40 heavy tank would be a match for most other tanks 
of its class. The lack of resources, power, and technical expertise 
depressed production. While Sandvovich acknowledges the Italy’s war 
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economy was not perfect, the root of the army’s operation and 
technological failings were by no means largely self-inflicted.  
According to Sandvovich, the economic and tactical doctrines of the 
Third Reich were the main cause of Italy’s apparent humiliation. 
Germany was almost as unprepared for total war as Italy was in 1939. 
The men in charge of fueling the German war economy corrected this 
deficit by thoroughly plundering Europe of its military and natural 
resources. Italy, cut off from Soviet and American imports by German 
declarations of war, desperately needed raw materials to maintain their 
war economy. German actions ensured these assets were not 
forthcoming. Germany appropriated Italian sources of coal in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, and took the lion’s share of Romanian oil. The 
Germans even appropriated most of the assets from Yugoslavia and 
Greece, countries supposedly in Italy's sphere of influence.69 German 
bad faith was further demonstrated by Hitler’s refusal to honour 
accords on economic aid.70  
Additionally, Sandvovich stresses that it was actually the Germans who 
were disloyal to their ally. Hitler was deeply distrustful of his non 
German allies, and once claimed that “every second Italian is either a 
traitor or a spy.”71 The Führer would not provide German weaponry 
without German soldiers attached to them. Italy, who had sent it finest 
vehicles and guns to fight and die in Russia, was in essence abandoned 
by Germany.72 Eighty thousand Italians would lose their lives across 
the Soviet Union; a figure four times as large as the number of 
Germans who died in North Africa. In the theatre where Italy’s 
survival was to be determined, German support was kept to the 
absolute minimum prevent total collapse.73  
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Knox may also have an “an anti-fascist bias”74 that weakens the 
strength of his work. Far from the blood thirsty tyrant depicted by 
Knox, Sandkovich argues that Mussolini was a victim of German 
duplicity as well as a sensible statesman. According to Sandkovich, 
Mussolini appears to have signed the Pact of Steel with the objection 
to stymie German belligerence. Mussolini went to war in 1940 out of 
fear, not stupidity. Worried that a victorious Germany would turn on 
Italy for impeding its annexation of Austria and its refusal to enter the 
war in 1939, Mussolini acted in an attempt to avoid becoming another 
German vassal state. Disgusted with “German political incompetence, 
racism, and brutality, and frustrated by his inability to get Hitler to 
appreciate the importance of the southern theatre,”75 Mussolini 
continually attempted to find a diplomatic resolution to the war. It was 
Hitler, not Mussolini, who was the irrational ideologue that continually 
backed his ally into corners which he had no chance of escaping. 
No doubt the Italian military had its share of errors in judgement. 
However, historians caught up in anti-Italian narratives have a 
tendency to portray the Italians in the worst possible light while giving 
others the benefit of the doubt. Erwin Rommel, head of the German 
Afrika Korp, is commonly depicted as “without question, the most 
outstanding battlefield commander of the war.”76 On the other hand, 
the Italian general Rodolfo Graziani is commonly portrayed as an 
“ignoramus”77 When both man retreated before the British rather than 
hold isolated, vulnerable positions, Rommel is titled a ‘genius’ while 
Graziani is labeled a coward who panicked in the face of adversity. 
This double standard can be found throughout accounts of the North 
African conflict. Sandkovich argues that in most situations, Italian 
commanders made reasonably competent decisions 
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Conclusion 
Although the historiographic debate still rages on, the false narratives 
of the post war era have begun to fade away. Contemporary experts 
on the Second World War would intensely disagree that it was “more 
detrimental for Germany to have Italy as an ally than simply to have 
fought her as an enemy.”78 While clearly incapable of fighting a first 
class world power by herself, Italy was valuable ally to Hitler. In Bruce 
Watson’s history of the North African theatre, he writes that the 
British had to shatter “Rommel’s Panzer Armie Afrika – and its 
supporting Italian divisions.”79 The phrasing of this statement has it 
backwards. From 1940 to mid-1943 Italy - not Germany - was the 
primary Axis power in both Africa and the Balkans. Vast amounts of 
Anglo-American material and hundreds of thousands of men that 
could have been used against Germany instead was devoted to fighting 
Italy. Italian assistance held up the Western powers and allowed 
Germany to concentrate the majority of its strength on the Eastern 
Front. Even after Italy’s surrender, the collaborationist Italian Social 
Republic continued the fight for the Axis.  
After Italy’s collapse, the Nazi regime was forced to redeploy 
significant forces to cover the areas once occupied by the Italian army. 
This forced the German forces stationed on the Russian front to be 
substantially reduced. By June 1944, there were 52 German divisions 
in Italy and the Balkans - about 18.3 per cent of Germany's 285 
divisions.80 When the Russians launched their great summer offensives 
of 1944, there were simply not enough Germans left to stop them. 
Additionally, Allied troops previously held down in North Africa were 
redirected to Operation Overlord. Without Italian support, the 
Germany Reich's attempt to turn back the Allied advance would prove 
pointless. 
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Anglo-Saxon historiography not only overlooks the Italian role in the 
war, but Germany’s other 'minor' allies as well. The Third Reich’s 
survival was dependent on the immense effort made by all of the 
nations that fought beside it. Without the combat troops, logistical 
support, and occupation forces provided by her allies, Germany could 
not have fought for so long in as many theatres as it did. German 
“arrogance, indifference, and ineptitude” concerning their allies led to 
horrific loss of life. Forty six non-German divisions from Allied Axis 
Armies were wiped out at Stalingrad alone.81 Without the contributions 
of Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland, Germany’s collapse 
would have come much earlier. For a more accurate understanding of 
the Second World War, the erroneous historiographic predominance 
of Germany must be corrected. 
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